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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

THE STATE OF UTAH,
BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.

Case No. 900483
AARON OLSEN,
Defendant/Appellant.

Priority No. 2

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction for a first degree felony. This
court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §78-2-2(3)0)
(1953 as amended).
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction and final judgment entered against appellant
in the Second Judicial District Court, in and for Weber County, the Honorable Stanton
Taylor, Judge, presiding. On August 24, 1990, appellant was found guilty by a jury
of the offense of aggravated robbery, a first degree felony as described in Utah Code
Annotated §76-6-302 (1953 as amended). Appellant was sentenced to a term of six
years to life imprisonment on September 10, 1990. Notice of Appeal was filed on
September 28, 1990.

1

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The following issues will be presented for review in this appeal:
1.

Did the trial court commit prejudicial error in refusing to exclude a

potential juror for cause?
2.

Was appellant denied his constitutional right to effective assistance of

counsel by the failure to challenge a for cause potential juror who exhibited a bias?
3.

Did the trial court commit prejudicial error by admitting an unreliable

eyewitness identification of appellant that was based on suggestive procedures and
limited observation?
4.

Did the trial court commit prejudicial error by allowing the hearsay

statements of alleged co-conspirators to be admitted into evidence?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
There are differing standards of review for these issues.

The appropriate

standard will be described in the opening paragraph of each point in the argument.
APPLICABLE STATUTES AND RULES
Rule 801 of the Utah Rules of Evidence:
The following definitions apply under this article:
(a) Statement. A "statement" is (1) an oral or
written assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct of a person, if it
is intended by him as an assertion.
(b) Declarant. A "declarant" is a person who makes
a statement.
(c) Hearsay. "Hearsay" is a statement, other than
one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or
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hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter
asserted.
(d) Statements which are not hearsay. A statement
is not hearsay if: . . .
(2) Admission by party-opponent. The
statement is offered against a party and is
(E) a statement by a co-conspirator of a party
during the course and in furtherance of the
conspiracy.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On July 16, 1990, appellant was charged in two single count informations.
One alleged aggravated robbery, a violation of Utah Code Annotated §76-6-302
(1953 as amended). (R. 3)1 A second information alleged conspiracy to commit
aggravated robbery, a violation of Utah Code Annotated §76-4-201 (1953 as
amended). (R. 4)

An amended information was filed on August 20, 1990, joining

those charges. (R. 49-50) Trial commenced on August 23, 1990.

At the close of

the evidence the trial court dismissed the conspiracy count on appellant's motion. (T.
437) 2 Appellant was convicted of the offense of aggravated robbery as charged in
the information. (R. 71) On September 24, 1990, appellant was sentenced to five
years to life for the conviction of aggravated robbery. (R. 100)

A one year

consecutive sentence for a weapon enhancement was imposed pursuant to Utah Code

1

"R." refers to the district court file.

2,,

T." refers to the transcript of the trial.
3

Annotated §76-3-203(1) (1953 as amended). (R. 100) Notice of Appeal was filed on
September 28, 1990. (R. 105)
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
During the summer of 1990, J. C. Mouille was employed as a truck driver for
United Parcel Service (UPS). (T. 87) One of his duties involved transporting to Salt
Lake City receipts, including cash, collected by UPS drivers from Ogden and Logan.
(T. 91-93)

Mouille would generally carry the bags of receipts and cash from the

building to his truck between 9:30 and 10:30 p.m. (T. 91-93) On June 28, 1990,
Mouille was carrying the bags of receipts to his truck. (T. 89) The bags contained
over sixteen thousand dollars in cash. (T. 139, 141) As he was about to enter the
truck, he heard a voice. (T. 94) When Mouille turned around, he saw an individual
approaching with a gun. (T. 95) The gunman made a number of verbal threats to kill
Mouille as he approached. (T. 98)
Mouille was ordered to lay on the ground. (T. 99) When he did so, the gun
man took the bags and ran down the street. (T. 100)

Mouille testified that he

watched the gunman as he ran away. (T. 99) Mouille described the gunman as being
five-feet-four inches to five-feet-five inches in height. (T. 108) Although the gunman
was wearing a wool hat, Mouille was able to observe that he had blonde hair. (T. 109)
As Mouille laid on the ground, Michael Harris approached driving a UPS truck. (T. 101,
120-121) Mouille got up, stopped Harris and indicated he had been robbed. (T. 121)
Harris followed the gunman in his truck to a late model four door cadillac. (T. 123)
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Harris attempted to follow the car as it drove away. During the chase, Harris heard
two loud pops that he believed to be gunshots. (T. 123-124) Harris then lost sight
of the car as it turned on 31st Street in Ogden. (T. 124)
On July 2 or 3 f 1990, Roy Hair, an employee of the post office in Provo, Utah,
observed a green plastic garbage bag by a fence on the post office property. (T. 157)
On July 1 1 , 1990, John Lebere, a maintenance worker at that same post office
opened the bag and discovered UPS receipts and currency pouches. (T. 163) Richard
Harris, another postal employee turned the bag over to representatives of UPS. (T.
170)

The contents of the bag were inspected by Ron Ceyba, the district loss

prevention supervisor for UPS. (T. 327, 344)

Ceyba determined that the bag

contained items taken in the June 28 robbery. (T. 343)

However, the sixteen

thousand dollars in currency was missing. (T. 343) Ceyba also found a business card
for a Lee Levitt in the bag. (T. 432) The card had a hand written note on it to a
"Troy" and a lipstick print. (T. 250-252)
LeeAnn Levitt was interviewed about the business card. (T. 354)

She told

investigators that the card was written by her roommate, Shannon Fairbanks, on June
28, 1990. (T. 250) The two had been out drinking and dancing that evening. (T.
250) They stopped by the apartment of Fairbanks' boyfriend, Troy Powell, to see if
he wanted to go to breakfast. (T. 250) When there was no answer on the door,
Levitt and Fairbanks left the note on the back of Levitt's business card. (T. 251-252)
Appellant's finger print was located on that card. (T. 393)
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Investigators believed that the robber had inside information from UPS
employees. (T. 331-332)

Based on that belief, Levitt and Fairbanks were asked if

they knew any UPS employees. (T. 253) They both indicated that Cary Nichols, a
friend of Powell's was employed at UPS. (T. 254) Levitt and Fairbanks also told the
investigators that appellant's physical description was similar to that of the gunman.
(T. 254)

Fairbanks and Levitt agreed to aid investigators by surreptitiously tape

recording a conversation about the robbery between themselves, Powell and Nichols.
(T. 261)

Levitt testified that during the conversation Powell and Nichols neither

admitted nor denied being involved in the robberies. (T. 263) Powell and Nichols also
made statements about avoiding the police and leaving the country. (T. 365)
Employees of the Ogden UPS office testified that they had seen appellant,
Nichols and Powell at that office several weeks prior to the robbery. Mike Harris
indicated that he observed Nichols and Powell at that facility on May 30, 1990. (T.
127) Powell was introduced as a UPS employee by Nichols. (T. 189) Employment
records indicated that Powell never worked for UPS. (T. 338) Lisa Adams, a clerk at
UPS testified that she had observed appellant at the facility several weeks prior to the
robbery. (T. 142) She indicated that she did not realize that it was appellant that she
had observed until she saw him in court when she testified at the preliminary hearing
about preparing the money orders that were stolen. (T. 147)

Evidence was also

introduced that the appellant had purchased about fifteen hundred dollars worth of
clothes for himself and his daughter shortly after the robbery. (T. 305, 310)
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J. C. Mouille, the victim of the robbery, identified appellant at trial as the
gunman in the robbery. (T. 95) Initially, Mouille was shown a group of photographs
that contained a picture of appellant. (T. 110) Mouille was unable to identify anybody
in the photographic array as the robber. (T. 110) He then attended a line-up where
he did not positively identify appellant. (T. 112)

At that line-up, Mouille had two of

the seven people step forward, Mouille then stated that if he had to choose one
person, it would be the appellant. (T. 112-113) The first positive identification of
appellant made by Mouille was at the preliminary hearing. At that hearing, appellant
was the only person sitting as the defendant at the counsel table. (T. 112) It was
also the third opportunity that Mouille had to observe the appellant and identify him
as the robber.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
The trial court failed to excuse a potential juror for cause who had expressed
a bias in favor of police officers.

The juror equivocated when the trial judge

questioned the juror about such bias. One of appellant's peremptory challenges was
used to strike that potential juror. Any failure of trial counsel to challenge that juror
for cause denied appellant the effective assistance of counsel. These errors require
that a new trial be granted.
The trial court failed to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the admissibility of
the eyewitness identification of appellant as the perpetrator of the robbery. The
circumstances of the robbery indicate that the eyewitness had a limited opportunity
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to observe and was able to give only a vague description of the robber. A positive
identification was not made until after appellant's likeness or person was presented
to the eyewitness on two prior occasions. These errors require either an evidentiary
hearing to determine the admissibility of the identification or suppression of the
eyewitness identification.
Statements made by Troy Powell and Cary Nichols should not have been
admitted into evidence under the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule. The
evidence was not sufficient to establish that there was a conspiracy. Furthermore,
the statements made were not a furtherance of any conspiracy to commit a crime.
A new trial should be granted as a result of this error.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN
REFUSING TO EXCUSE A POTENTIAL JUROR FOR CAUSE
WHO HAD EXPRESSED BIAS REGARDING THE
CREDIBILITY OF POLICE OFFICERS.
The standard of review of a failure to excuse a potential juror for cause is
whether the trial court abused its discretion. State v. Brooks, 563 P.2d 799 (Utah
1977). An abuse of discretion exits when the court refuses to excuse a juror for
cause who has expressed an actual bias as defined in Rule 18(e)(10) of the Utah Rules
of Criminal Procedure and that potential juror's disclaimer of partiality is reluctant or
equivocal. State v. Brooks, supra. However, the court of appeals has indicated that
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when counsel fails to challenge a potential juror for cause, that error must be
evaluated under a "plain error" standard, State v. Ellifritz,

P.2d

, 188 UAR

14 (Utah App. 1992).
The potential jurors were asked if any of them were more likely to believe the
testimony of a law enforcement officer than other witnesses. (T. 48-49) Three jurors
expressed such a bias relating to the credibility of police officers. (T. 49-55)

Mr.

Hodge indicated that he was employed with Clearfield City and worked with police on
investigations. (T. 50) He indicated that he believed police officers' training would
result in their giving a better description of an incident. (T. 50)

The trial judge

explained that the jurors would have to determine if the witnesses were credible. (T.
54)

The judge then asked if the potential jurors could be neutral and fair in

determining the credibility of the officer's testimony. (T. 55) Mr. Creager who had
made similar statements about police officers, indicated he did not think he could be
fair. The trial judge excused him immediately. (T. 55) Following that action, defense
counsel stated that he had not heard Mr. Hodge's reply. Hodge replied, "I think I can
be neutral." (T. 56)

The trial judge did not excuse Hodge for cause as he had

previously done with Creager. (T. 56)3

The defense used its first peremptory

challenge to strike Hodge. (R. 62)

3

Defense counsel did not specifically object to the court's ruling and did pass the
panel for cause. (T. 65) If this court finds that the failure to object constituted a
waiver then the issue of an effective assistance of counsel should be addressed. See
Point II, supra.
9

This court has addressed the need to excuse potential jurors for cause based
on expressions of bias in a number of contexts. Actual bias has been described as
strong and deep impressions in potential jurors. State v. Lacv, 665 P.2d 1317 (Utah
1983); State v. Moton. 749 P.2d 639 (Utah 1988); State v. Hewitt, 689 P.2d 22
(Utah 1986). In State v. Brooks. 631 P.2d 878 (Utah 1981) 4 , the court stated,
. . . actual bias is to be determined by the potential
juror's state of mind. By necessity this must be ascertained
by the expressions of attitudes, opinions, and feelings of
the juror. Whenever the voir dire evokes a strong emotional
response, there is posed a warning that the juror may not
have a mental attitude of appropriate indifference to the
party or cause before the court. In assessing this response,
the statutory test is whether the expressed state of mind
of the juror leads to a just inference in reference to the
cause or parties that he will not act with entire impartiality.
In other words, based on the juror's expressed feelings,
attitudes, and opinions, the trial court must determine by a
process of logic and reason, based upon common
experience, whether the juror can stand in an attitude of
indifference between the state and the accused.
Furthermore, when a juror has expressed an attitude
indicating prejudice or bias, such cannot be attenuated by
the juror's determination that he can render an impartial
verdict. The juror cannot be the judge of his qualifications;
this function is the responsibility of the trial court.
631 P.2d at 884.
There are a number of areas in which this court has found that potential jurors
expressed an actual bias that would require their being excused for cause.

In

Crawford v. Manning, 542 P.2d 1091 (Utah 1975), the potential juror in a wrongful

4

This case will be denominated "Brooks II:, herein.
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death case expressed strong feelings against those who would attempt to collect
money for the death of another. State v. Moore, 562 P.2d 629 (Utah 1977), involved
a drug prosecution in which the potential juror had a negative attitude about people
who used or sold narcotics. A relationship of respect or esteem to a witness also
requires that potential juror be excused for cause, State v. Brooks, supra. In State v.
Ball, 685 P.2d 655 (Utah 1984), this court indicated that if a prospective juror's
religious beliefs evidence actual bias, a challenge for cause should be granted. Finally,
in State v. Jones, 734 P.2d 473 (Utah 1987), two potential jurors in a murder case
indicated they knew the family of the victim. One stated that she hoped that the
association would not affect her ability to be impartial. The other felt that it would
be difficult if the defendant was acquitted, but she could follow the law. This court
held that since those expressions of bias focused directly on the defendant, their later
assertions of impartiality could not attenuate the bias.
This court has also found actual bias when there is evidence of a favoritism
toward a particular class of witness.

In Jenkins v. Parrish, 627 P.2d 533 (Utah

1981), the potential juror in a medical malpractice case indicated that she would be
somewhat partial toward the testimony of a doctor. The court held that to be an
expression of actual bias. Likewise, in both State v. Bailey, 605 P.2d 265 (Utah
1980) and State v. Hewitt, supra, potential jurors indicated that they would be more
likely to believe the testimony of police officers.

This court found that such

indications are an expression of actual bias by those potential jurors. In the instant
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case, Mr. Hodge expressed that same bias regarding the testimony of police officers.
This was based, in part, on an ongoing relationship that Hodge shared with police
officers that he worked with on a regular basis. (T. 50)
The next issue to determine is whether Hodge's equivocal denial of partiality
was sufficient to withstand a challenge for cause. In Brooks II, supra, two members
of the jury pool indicated that they had been victims of crimes. One indicated that
this experience might affect his thinking or attitude about the trial. The second juror
indicated that she was very emotional about being the victim of a robbery. She stated
that she would probably react emotionally to the evidence. After further questioning,
the trial judge asked if she could return an impartial verdict based on the evidence
presented and the instructions given by the court. The prospective juror responded,
"Okay, yes, I think I could do that." with respect to such equivocal responses, this
court stated,
The state of mind of these jurors, as revealed by the
facts in this case, leads to the just inference in reference to
the cause that they could not act with entire impartiality.
Their reluctant disclaimers of partiality run counter to
human nature and appear, particularly in the case of Mrs.
Scouten, to be impelled by a desire to attain approval. The
trial court abused it's discretion by not excusing these
jurors for cause, [emphasis in original]
631 P.2d at 884
The equivocation expressed in Brooks II is indistinguishable from that expressed
in the case at bar. When discussing putting her personal bias out of the decision
making process, the potential juror in Brooks II, stated, "Okay, yes, I think I could do
that". In this case, Mr. Hodge indicated that police officers are more believable as
1?

witnesses because they are trained observers. This was based on the fact that Hodge
worked with police officers on a regular basis. (T. 50) When questioned by the judge
about his ability to be fair he indicated, "I think I can be neutral." This equivocation
had immediately followed the trial judge summarily excusing a potential juror who
indicated he did not think he could be neutral. (T. 55) Hodge's statement obviously
indicates a desire to attain approval by the court. Hodge's response fails to meet the
requirement that potential jurors exhibit an attitude of appropriate indifference. The
statement by Hodge in the instant case is indistinguishable from the "reluctant
disclaimer" condemned in Brooks II. Consequently, the trial court committed error in
refusing to excuse Mr. Hodge from the potential jury panel for cause.
This court has found that the error in refusing to excuse a potential juror for
cause is prejudicial if the aggrieved party had to use a peremptory challenge to strike
that juror. 5 In the instant case, the first preemptory challenge exercised by appellant
was for Mr. Hodge. (T. 62) Consequently, the error in refusing to excuse Mr. Hodge
for cause was prejudicial. Appellant's judgment and conviction must be reversed and
a new trial ordered.6

5

Crawford v. Manning, supra; State v. Moore, supra; State v. Brooks, supra; State
v. Bailey, supra; Jenkins v. Parrish, supra; State v. Brooks (II), supra; State v. Ball,
supra; State v. Hewitt, supra; and State v. Jones; supra.
6

ln Ellifritz. supra, the court of appeals indicated that there must be a showing
that, absent the error, the outcome of the trial would be different. That is an
impossible burden to meet when the error is in the jury selection process. That is
because there is no change in the evidence admitted or the law to apply to that
evidence. Rather, the jury selection process affects the fairness of the trier of fact in
13

POINT II
ANY FAILURE TO OBJECT TO PASSING POTENTIAL
JUROR HODGE FOR CAUSE DENIED APPELLANT HIS
RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, as applied to the
states guarantees a criminal defendant the right to counsel. Gideon v. Wainwriaht.
372 U. S. 335 (1963). In Strickland v. Washington, 446 U.S. 668 (1984), the Court
held that the Sixth Amendment also entitles criminal defendants to effective
assistance of counsel. In reviewing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, this
court has stated, "the burden of establishing inadequate representation is on the
defendant 'and proof of such must be a demonstrable reality and not a speculative
matter/" Codianna v. Morris, 660 P.2d 1101 at 1109 (Utah 1983).
Strickland v. Washington, supra, established a two pronged test to be applied
to determine if a defendant has been denied his right to effective assistance of
counsel. The court stated,
First, the defendant must show that counsel's
performance was deficient. This requires showing that
counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not
functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed the defendant by
the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show
that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This
requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as
to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result
is unreliable.

a case. Consequently, the use of a peremptory challenge to remove the questionable
juror would be sufficient to demonstrate prejudice.
14

446 U.S. at 687.
In State v. Templin. 805 P.2d 182 (Utah 1990), this court held that a
defendant has the burden of meeting both parts of this test. In Templin the court
noted that under the first part of the test the defendant must identify specific acts or
omissions by counsel which fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. This
court further noted that the conduct would not fall within decisions attributable to
"sound trial strategy."
In the instant case, the potential jury was passed for cause without an objection
to Mr. Hodge. (T. 65) As was shown in Point I, Hodge expressed a state of mind
indicating that he should have been removed for cause. The failure to request that
Hodge be removed for cause was obviously not a matter of trial strategy as counsel
used his first peremptory challenge to remove that same juror.

The use of the

peremptory challenge also establishes the prejudice prong of the Strickland analysis.7
Appellant's judgment and conviction should be reversed and a new trial ordered.
POINT III
THE ADMISSION OF THE EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION
TESTIMONY VIOLATED APPELLANT'S RIGHT TO DUE
PROCESS OF LAW.
The appellate review of the admissibility of evidence in relation to a
constitutionally based objection is a question of law.

Such questions of law are

reviewed for correctness, State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991).

7

See: footnotes 5 and 6, supra.
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Factual

findings that provide the basis for the determination of the admissibility of evidence
are viewed in a light most favorable to the trial court's decision. Those findings will
be reversed only if they are against the clear weight of the evidence, Ramirez, supra.
Prior to trial, counsel for appellant filed a motion in limine contesting the admissibility
of the eyewitness identification evidence. (R. 47) A hearing was held on that issue.
(T. of 8-20-90) 8 However, no evidence was taken and the trial judge indicated that
a decision would not be made until he heard that witness' testimony. (T. of 8-20-90
at p. 16)
In State v. Ramirez, supra, this court discussed the procedures to be employed
in determining the admissibility of eyewitness identification evidence. An analysis to
determine the admissibility of such evidence under the Utah Constitution was also
established. That form of analysis was substantially different than that employed in
a federal constitutional analysis. The court noted that the procedure to be employed
is analogous to the determination of the voluntariness of a confession.
With respect to those procedures, the court stated,
The burden of demonstrating the admissibility of the
proffered evidence is on the prosecution. It must lay a
foundation upon which the trial court can make any
necessary preliminary factual findings and reach any
necessary legal conclusions.

"T. of 8-20-92" refers to the transcript of the motion hearing.
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817 P.2d at 778. The court indicated that the jury may be making similar factual
determinations in deciding guilt or innocence. With respect to that situation, the court
stated,
Potential for role confusion and for erosion of
constitutional guarantees inheres in this overlap of
responsibility of judge and jury to determine the same
issue. Because the jury is not bound by the judge's
preliminary factual determination made in ruling on
admissibility, the trial court may be tempted to abdicate its
charge as gatekeeper to carefully scrutinize proffered
evidence for constitutional defects and may simply admit
the evidence, leaving all questions pertinent to its reliability
to the jury. But courts cannot properly sidestep their
responsibility to perform the required constitutional
admissibility analysis. To do so would leave protection of
constitutional rights to the whim of a jury and would
abandon the courts' responsibility to apply the law.
817 P.2dat 778.
In this case, appellant made the requisite motion, but no evidentiary hearing
was conducted. It was the state's burden to demonstrate the admissibility of the
evidence, State v. Ramirez, supra. The failure of the state to produce the evidence
once the issue was raised was error.9 The position of the trial court in not ruling on

9

The deputy county attorney took the position that the reliability of eyewitness
identification is not a matter of suppression. He stated,
[Mr. Daroczi]. . The defendant is identified, and at the
preliminary hearing the victim said this—this man is the one
who held the gun on me. It's-although it's-we had some
problems, it was less than a positive identification when
there was a photographic line-up, and, also, there was a
physical line-up.
There was some hesitation.
The
defendant-the victim had-had narrowed it down to two
17

the motion is simply the type of abdication of responsibility that was condemned in
Ramirez. At minimum, this court should remand the case to the district court for such
a hearing and order the trial judge to enter appropriate factual findings.
The eyewitness identification evidence also fails to meet the test for reliability
required by Article I, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution as established in Ramirez. In
that case, the court rejected the five part federal analysis established in Neil v.
Biaaers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972). 10 This court noted in State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483
(Utah 1986), that several of the criteria relied upon in Biggers should be rejected
because they were based on assumptions that were contradicted by well accepted
empirical studies. The court then relied upon the factors described in the proposed
jury instruction in Long to provide the basis for the Article I, Section 7 analysis.11
The court in Long considered four basic factors: (1) the witness' opportunity to
observe the criminal actor; (2) The witness' capacity to observe the person
committing the crime; (3) The witness' attentiveness to the person committing the

and then finally picked the defendant as--as the party who
held the gun on him.
So I think if counsel wants to attack that for-for
what it's worth, but I think it's more-more crossexamination of the victim than anything else that's the
subject of suppression. (Tr. 8-20-90 at p. 11)
10

Those factors include: (1) the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal
at the time of the crime, (2) the witness' degree of attention, (3) the accuracy of the
witness' prior description, (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at
the confrontation, and (5) the length of time between the crime and the confrontation.
11

That instruction is set out in its entirety in the addendum.
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The second factor, the witness' capacity to observe the person committing the
offense, includes such considerations such as stress or fright, visual defects and
fatigue or injury. The record does not indicate that Mouille suffered from fatigue or
visual defects.

However, the robbery must have been a very stressful situation.

Mouille was held at gunpoint (T. 95) and the robber made threats to kill him. (T. 98)
The third factor, the witness' attentiveness, involves considerations of the witness'
awareness that a crime was being committed, State v. Ramirez, supra. Mouille was
the victim of the robbery. There is no question that he was aware of that fact. He
also testified that he attempted to look at the robber to make an identification. (Tr.
99)
The fourth factor discussed in Long is of critical importance to this case. That
factor involves an evaluation of whether the witness' identification of appellant was
completely the product of his own memory.

In Ramirez this court described

considerations important to this factor;
Here, relevant circumstances include the length of
time that passed between the witness's observation at the
time of the event and the identification of defendant; the
witness's mental capacity and state of mind at the time of
the identification; the witness' exposure to opinions,
descriptions, identifications, or other information from other
sources; instances when the witness or other eyewitness
to the event failed to identify defendant; instances when
the witness or other eyewitnesses gave a description of the
actor that is inconsistent with defendant; and the
circumstances under which defendant was presented to the
witness for identification.
817 P . 2 d a t 7 8 3 .
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ned with the initial vague description

of the robber and the circumstances under which Mouille made the observations
require suppression of the identificatio

Id be ordered

because the only other evidence to connect appellant with the crime was a fingerprint
on the card found with the UPS property in July. That evidence fails to show that
appellant committed the robbery. In the alternative, this court should require that an
evidentiary hearing be held consistent with the procedures described in Ramirez.
Based on that hearing, the district court judge should be required to make findings
relative to the factors described in Ramirez and determine if a new trial is required.
POINT IV
THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT FOUNDATION TO ADMIT
HEARSAY AS STATEMENTS OF COCONSPIRATORS,
FURTHERMORE, THE STATEMENTS WERE NOT MADE IN
FURTHERANCE OF THE CONSPIRACY.
Several statements of Cary Nichols were admitted against the defendant as
statements made during the course of a conspiracy.12
admission of those statements.

(Tr. 188, 214)

Counsel objected to the

This court has indicated that a

"clearly erroneous" standard should be employed in reviewing claimed errors in
admitting such evidence, State v. Gray, 717 P.2d 1313 (Utah 1986).
In Gray, the court addressed the analysis to be employed in dealing Rule
801(d)(2)(E) of the Utah Rules of Evidence.13 The court stated,

12

Rule 801(d)(2)(E) of the Utah Rules of Evidence.

13

That rule provides:
A statement is not hearsay if . . . the statement is offered
against a party and is . . . a statement by a coconspirator
of a party during the course and in furtherance of the
conspiracy.
22

To utilize the exceptioi 1, the State must introduce
evidence independent and exclusive of the conspirator's
hearsay statements themselves, showing the existence of
a criminal joint venture and the defendant's participation
therein i
Independent evidence of the declarant's
membership in the criminal venture is also required.
"Otherwise, hearsay would lift itself by its own bootstraps
to the level of competent evidence." [footnotes omitted]
, .
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the June 28, 11,1:1 \ 1 uiiiiei ' - 11 \ .p; I ' 1 ;i 1 "<Pr employee in Salt Lake City, Janet Terry.
216-217)

Terry was putting a bag ml quarters into a safe near Nichols iJi.sk,

Nichols asked her where the money was pn.-h'ii up i I I

14

I

mriey was in the

ln Bouriailv v. United States. 483 US * - , " '1987), the Court allowed trial courts
to consider the coconspirator's stateme? \
- ™ : - : ~a the existence and scope of
that conspiracy.

safe. She told him that Wells Fargo would bring in the money and about $600 was
kept in the safe. She found this to be an unusual conversation. (T. 217) The final
group of statements were made to LeeAnn Levitt and Shannon Fairbanks after these
two had been questioned by police. Nichols and Powell told Levitt and Fairbanks to
tell the officers the truth about their knowledge of the robbery-they did not know
anything about it. (T. 263) Nichols and Powell also asked the two to say nothing of
trips to Ogden. (T. 292) They then made statements about avoiding the police and
leaving the country. (T. 365)
None of these statements were made during the course and in furtherance of
the conspiracy. An example of what constitutes such a statement is found in State
v. Gray, supra. In that case, the undercover agent testified that the co-defendant
stated, "We're going out to get the dope." Later the co-defendant indicated that she
and the defendant had to leave quickly to get the drugs. The court held that these
statements were intended to indicated to the purchaser that the cocaine would be
delivered soon, thus facilitating the drug transaction. The statements at issue here
involve the reasons for taking an unrelated trip to the UPS center in Ogden, questions
about money in a safe in Salt Lake City and advice to two potential witnesses to be
truthful. Such statements clearly are not made in furtherance of any conspiracy. The
statements do not indicate any participation in a crime nor do they substantiate any
agreement to commit a crime.
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eventual independent proof of the criminal venture and the
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before the case is submitted to the jury, [footnotes omitted]
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These facts are not sufficient to establish that Nichols, Powell and appellant
entered into an agreement to commit a crime. In State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141
(Utah 1989), this court found that the evidence established such an agreement.
Witnesses testified about meetings where thee defendant had discussed drug
distribution. Those witnesses also testified that deliveries of cocaine which they
observed or in which they participated. Similarly, in State v. Gray, supra, the witness
met the defendant and discussed the quality of the cocaine to be purchased. Gray
and the co-defendant left in Gray's car and returned with cocaine. Gray then divided
the cocaine and provided part to the witness. A similar transaction took place about
a week later where the actions of Gray and the co-defendant were described by the
witnesses. This court found those facts sufficient to establish the conspiracy for
purposes of Rule 801(d)(2)(E).

The evidence in this case shows, at best, that

appellant and the others were friends and that appellant may have been driving a car
rented by Powell and Nichols. Appellant was not with Powell and Nichols when those
two were at the scene of the robbery some six weeks before it occurred. The
fingerprint evidence establishes that appellant and Powell may have been together
after the robbery, but fails to indicate that appellant participated in the robbery.
Consequently, the evidence fails to establish the foundation for the introduction of the
hearsay statements. 15

The trial court committed error in admitting the hearsay

15

Although the burden of proof is higher, the trial judge dismissed the conspiracy
count at the close of the evidence. (T. 437)
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statements. Appellant's judgmei it

' d i iew ti ial

ordered.
C0IMCLUS10N
i process requires that appellant's judgment and
conviction be reversed and a new trial ordered. Likewise the o ^ ^
eyewitness identification

imitting
>ir-eni a..u

convictioi » be reversed and a new trial ordered without the eyewitness or hearsay
evidence being admitted

'-

+u

r alternative, f rn; *:o
admissibility of the eyewitness identification with

an order that the districi c ourt judge make findings of fact and conclusions of law on
that issue.
DATED this

^ u y „ . -jptember, 1992.

G. FRED METOS
Attorney for Appellant

STEPHEN R. McCAUGHEY
Attorney for Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed/hand delivered
on this
day of September, 1992, to:
Attorney General's Office
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
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The proposed

instruction from State v. Long,

supra,
One of the most important questions [ ! f le only
important question] in this case is the identification of the
defendant as the person who committed the crime. The
prosecution has the burder i of proving beyond a reasonable
doubt, not only iliat the crime was committed, but also
that the defendant was the person who committed the
crime. If, after considering the evidence you have heard
from both sides, you are not coi ivii iced beyond
reasonable doubt that the defendant is the person who
committed the crime, yoi i mi jst find the defendant not
guilty.
I"he identification testimony that yuu have heard wns
an expression of belief or impression by the witnesses
find the defendant not guilty, yoi11leed not believe that the
identification witness was mistake.! i in his [her] belief or
impression.
Many factors affect the accuracy of identification.
In considering whether the prosecution has proved beyond
a reasonable doubt that the defendant is the person who
committed the crime, you should consider the following:
11
Did the witness have an adequate opporti inity
to observe the criminal actor?
In answering this questio
)u should consider;
•ii
the length of time v.*) witnesses r.hsorv^u tho
actor:
" u ~ distance betwee
actor
O
ine exterit to whicf»the actor's features were
visible and undisguised;
d)

x\ ie light or lack, of light at the plact; dn<l

\

of observation;
e)
the presence [or] absence of distracting noises
oi .M.in 'M
jring the observation;
1)
any other circumstances affecting the witness7
opportunity to observe the person committing the crime.
2)
Did the witness have the capacity to observe
the person committing the crime?
In answering this questioii, you should consider
whether the witness' capacity was impaired by:

a)
stress or fright at the time of observation;
b)
personal motivations, biases or prejudices;
c)
uncorrected visual defects;
d)
fatigue or injury;
e)
drugs or alcohol.
[You should also consider whether the witness is of
a different race than the criminal actor. Identification by a
person of a different race may be less reliable than
identification by a person of the same race.]
[3)
Was the witness sufficiently attentive to the
criminal actor at the time of the crime?
In answering this question, you should consider
whether the witness knew that a crime was taking place
during the time he [she] observed the actor. Even if the
witness had adequate opportunity and capacity to observe
the criminal actor, he [she] may not have done so unless he
[she] was aware that a crime was being committed.]
4)
Was the witness' identification of the
defendant completely the product of his [her] own
memory?
In answering this question, you should consider:
a)
the length of time that passed between the
7
witness original observation and his [her] identification of
the defendant;
b)
the witness' [mental] capacity and state of
mind at the time of the identification;
c)
the witness' exposure to opinions, descriptions
or identifications given by other witnesses, to photographs
or newspaper accounts, or to any other information or
influence that may have affected the independence of his
[her] identification;
[d)
any instances when the witness, or any
eyewitness to the crime, failed to identify the defendant;]
[e)
any instances when the witness, or any
eyewitness to the crime, gave a description of the actor
that is inconsistent with the defendant's appearance;]
f)
the circumstances under which the defendant
was presented to the witness for identification.
[You may take into account that an identification
made by picking the defendant from a group of similar
individuals is generally more reliable than in identification
made from the defendant being presented alone to the
witness.]

lYou may also take into account that identification,"i
made from seeing the person are generally more reli*ihir
than identifications made from a photograph.1
I again emphasize that the burden of proving that the
defendant is the person who committed the crime is on the
prosecution. If, after considering the evidence you have
heard from the prosecution and from the defense, and after
evaluating the eyewitness testimony in light of the
considerations listed above, you have a reasonable doubt
about whether the defendant is the person who committed
the crime, you must find him not guilty.
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Defendant having been convicted by PQ a jury; [ 1 the court; [3 plea of guilty,
[]plea of no contest; of the offense of AQ3SAVAIED ROBBER?.
, a
felony of the 1st
degree, being now present in court and ready for sentence,
is now adjudicated guilty of the above offense and is now sentenced as follows:
"t?als
THE BASIC SENTENCE
• •/// [ ] not to exceed five (5) years at the Utah State Prison;
[ ] not less than one (1) year nor more than fifteen (15) years at Utah State Prison;
/<
fffe
K not less than five (5) years and which may be for life at Utah State Prison;
[ ] to pay fine in the amount of $^
.
//
ENHANCED PUNISHMENT FOR FIREARM USE
,;;- ^ T Defendant is additionally sentenced as follows:
^
K one (1) year at Utah State Prison, pursuant to 76-3-203^7)) (2) or (3) ;(Mandatory)
„.__
J>] not to exceed five (5) years at Utah State Prison pursuant to 76-3-203(1),(2) or (3);
y'"Xl ] not less than five (5) years nor more than ten (10) years at Utah State Prison,
•'/•-.//—•- pursuant to 76-3-203(4);
-..•c-^ti/ said /Sentence„tQ.run consecutiveTlo.the basissentence as set forth above.
*/?//
(X) Che XX) additional year at Utah State Prison pursuant to 76-3-203 (1) (Weapons
r
"
HABITUAL CRIMINAL ALTERNATIVE PUNISHMENT
Erihancerasnt)
Upon a finding that the defendant is in the status of an habitual criminal, the
defendant is sentenced to:
[ ] not less than five (5) years and which may be for life at Utah State Prison.
RESTITUTION
[ ] Defendant is ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $ (to be detenmftqca)
;

f

Defendant is remanded into custody of:
P ] the Sheriff of this county, for delivery to the Warden or other appropriate
official at the Utah State Prison for execution of sentence; or
Warden for execution of this sentence.
Sentences are to run consecutive.
DATED this 10th day of Septenfcer, /*; , 19 90
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